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WEDNESDAY
OCTOBER 7, 1953

We arrived at the Hotel des Indes after a rocky night on the train. Our railroad car broke down at Rotterdam, so we made a transfer to another train. Harry Shullaw of the Embassy met us at the station.

At 2:30 Selden Chapin and I went to call on Minister Beyen. Previously Bill Trimble had told me that the President of the First Chamber, before which the question of the ratification of the EDC treaty will be placed this autumn, was intent on delaying its consideration and considerable doubt was felt as to whether the ratification could be achieved this year. I spoke to Beyen about this, and he said it was true the President was strongly opposed but he believed and hoped, although he could not promise, he could obtain a vote on it before January. He is anxious and optimistic about getting a two-thirds majority on this occasion.

I had a frank interchange with Beyen on the reports we had had concerning the Rome meeting. The tactics of the Dutch delegation there, headed by Van Starkenborgh, have confused the situation. Van Starkenborgh has taken the position that if the Dutch demands on economic integration are not satisfied they cannot agree to grant supranational institutions to the Political Community. He has consistently stated this position in a negative manner - "If no economic integration, then no supranational institutions," rather than "We must have both economic integration and supranational institutions." More seriously, he has so far joined the French delegation in insisting that the question of the executive be discussed on the "hypothesis" there will be no economic integration. He has insisted on this despite ~~M. Staercke's contention that~~ this "hypothesis" was contrary to the Luxembourg resolution and the Ministers' decision at Baden Baden. By so doing, Starkenborgh has (a) ~~seriously weakened~~ his bargaining position if the Dutch delegation were really interested in economic

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integration; and (b) played into the hands of Seydoux and the French delegation who, by refusing to agree to the Dutch position on economic integration, force the Dutch to carry the ball against supranational institutions. As a result, agreement on a supranational executive at Rome has been made impossible, and the French delegation has been encouraged to be intransigeant on the economic question. The French press is already blaming the Dutch for failure of the Conference to agree on the executive.

Starkenborgh's tactic, in the face of widespread popular and parliamentary support for economic union, has been to take as intransigeant a position as possible on demands for immediate economic union, and subordinate Dutch agreement on supranational institutions to acceptance of his economic demands. In this position, as on his basic objective, he has the full support of Drees; he has in the past sold his position to Beyen as a necessary tactical maneuver to obtain acceptance of Dutch economic demands.

All of the above is based on information our people have received in Rome and which we think is fairly reliable.

Beyen said that the Dutch will continue to insist on economic integration and see little point in a political community if its authority is confined merely to taking over the powers that would have been granted to the CSC and the EDC. However, he indicated that he had no knowledge of the Dutch delegation having proposed a third specialized authority and was unsympathetic to it.

Beyen also indicated that a compromise in the position of the Dutch regarding economic integration might be reached. He was familiar with the areas of agreement reached in the Economic Committee. Beyen thought that major matters representing differences between the various governments involved could not have been, even under the most favorable circumstances, settled in Rome and

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must await further discussion by the Foreign Ministers. He spoke of the delicate domestic situation in Holland in regard to EPC and said he would like to postpone the Ministers' meeting scheduled for October 22 at The Hague for three weeks or more. If this were done he would then attempt to bring about a closer understanding amongst the Foreign Ministers by individual approaches to them so that their eventual meeting would be more fruitful.

I expressed the view that following such a meeting the setting up of a Permanent Committee under a forceful chairman to deal with the remaining issues might be [redacted] useful. Beyen agreed and said he would give this his attention.

Although he said nothing about it himself, it was once more clear to me that Prime Minister Drees, who is opposed to the EDC and EPC, especially because of his dislike and lack of confidence in the French, will continue to do whatever he can to block a liberal attitude by the Dutch toward the EPC. The same sentiment exists amongst many of the functionaries in the Dutch Foreign Office. Since Beyen has no political party following, he is in a difficult position.

Mansholt, an excellent man, may, if some compromise is reached on the economic integration question, split the Labor Party by bucking Drees, [redacted] its elder statesman.

On the whole, I think our conversation was useful and satisfactory.

I then went to see the Minister of Economics, Mr. Zylstra. He is young and said to be [redacted] economist. He is a great believer in European integration but is tenaciously advocating the creation of a common market from the beginning in EPC. He said that if it were to work the ~~French would have to attain some~~ sort of monetary stability, that monetary stability is dependent upon financial stability which it seems hopeless to expect the French to achieve, and therefore the other better-governed nations of Europe will have to take the French in hand

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through a European organization and conduct them along the path [redacted] they should follow.

I went to the Embassy and talked on the telephone to Jim Conant. He does not want me to go to Germany tomorrow since it was impossible to arrange the meeting [redacted] we had wished with Adenauer and Hallstein. Instead, he wants [redacted] me to come up on the night of the 13th and [redacted] see them the following day. He cannot be there himself, but said there were reasons why I must, in spite of that, come to Bonn on that day.

At the Embassy I also talked with Connie Egan, the Public Affairs Officer, who has been approached by Mr. Nordness to take the position in USRO [redacted] Nordness had discussed with me. His reputation at The Hague is good and, from what I have seen and heard of him, I should be glad to have him come to Paris. The interest of my mission in what he would do here is [redacted] minor but I think he understands the problem and would consciously do nothing to embarrass the achievement of our purposes.

Tonight E. and I went to see John Houston's production of Le Moulin Rouge. Although the technical photography was beautiful, the Hollywood boys and girls certainly succeeded in massacring what one would have thought a [redacted] dramatic story.

We had lunch today at the Royal and dinner tonight at the Hotel.

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